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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-SYMBOLIC
PROTEST BY THE USE OF OPPROBRIOUS LANGUAGE
On April 26, 1968 Paul Cohen appeared in a Los Angeles County
Courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." He
entered the courtroom, removed his jacket, and held it folded over his
arm. A police officer, who had seen the jacket, sent a message to the
judge requesting that Cohen be held in contempt of court, but the judge
declined and returned a message informing the officer of his refusal.
Cohen, then entering a corridor where women and children were present,
was arrested by the officer. He was convicted in the Los Angeles Mu-
nicipal Court and sentenced to thirty-days imprisonment, for willfully dis-
turbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person by the use of
offensive conduct.' The California Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
viction 2 and the Supreme Court of California declined review in a split
decision. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
basis of the constitutional questions presented and found that absent a
more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, a state may not,
consistently with the first and fourteenth amendments, make the simple
public display of a single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. People
v. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
It would seem that the facts indicated in Cohen, taken in and of them-
selves, pose merely a criminal misdemeanor problem and thus have neg-
ligible significance. However, the constitutional issues presented are highly
significant, and the decision will carry a heavy impact upon subsequent
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970). The statute provides: "Every per-
son who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any neighborhood
or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or
threatening, traducing, quarrelling, challenging to fight, or fighting, or who, on the
public streets of any unincorporated town, or upon the public highways in such
unincorporated town, runs any horse race, either for a wager or for amusement, or
fire any gun or pistol in such unincorporated town, or use any vulgar, profane, or
indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud
and boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction by any
Court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by fine not exceeding two
hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the County Jail for not more than ninety
days, or by both fine and imprisonment, or either, at the discretion of the Court."
It should be noted that Cohen was charged with disturbing the peace by tumultu-
ous or offensive conduct and not for using vulgar or indecent language within the
hearing of women and children.
2. People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969).
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first amendment cases. For the first time the Supreme Court has held
that the use of opprobrious language, by itself, can play an essential part
in the exposition of ideas and is, therefore, subject to first amendment pro-
tection. Further, the Supreme Court found that the only conduct involved
in wearing such an inscription on a jacket is that of communication, which
is pure speech.
Therefore, the purpose of this casenote is to present and analyze the
major constitutional issues decided. This will be accomplished by a dis-
cussion of the general background and circumstances under which the
case arose. Further, the effect of past decisions and possible future con-
sequences and trends that will result from Cohen will be considered.
In laying a background, the first logical area of inquiry would be the
law of early England. At common law, there were basically two types
of breaches of the peace-actual breach of the peace, such as fighting
and dueling, and constructive breach, which tended to make others break
the peace, such as a challenge to fight.3 The spoken word, when viewed
in terms of common law breach of the peace, will fall in the latter cate-
gory, in that it is the reaction of the hearer to the words spoken that will
amount to an actual breach of the peace. Fundamental to a con-
structive breach is that the words must be spoken in an attempt to
provoke a breach of the peace. 4 Opprobrious language, however, though
a motive for a breach of the peace, did not tend immediately to the
breach of the peace and, therefore, was not indictable at common law.5
The common law concept that abusive language was not indictable as
a criminal offense was generally adopted in this country.6 The public
peace was interpeted as "that sense of security and repose which is the
right of every person under orderly government. '' 7  Mere words alone,
no matter how offensive, could not amount to a breach of the peace, be-
cause actual or threatened violence is an essential element. The fact that
the words used are either immoral or reprehensible is of no consequence,
3. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 142; see generally 2 ANDERSON, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 655 (1957); Rush, A Breach of the Peace by the
Spoken Word, 33 CONN. B.J. 114 (1959).
4. Ex parte Chapman, 4 AD. & E. 773, 111 Eng. Rep. 974 (1836); Ex parte
Marborough, 5 Q.B. 955, 114 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1844).
5. Ex parte Chapman, supra note 4; Ex parte Marlborough, supra note 4;
Regina v. Langley Holt, K.B. 654, 90 Eng. Rep. 1261 (1728); see generally 1
RUSSELL, CRIME 205 (9th ed. 1936).
6. E.g., Fischbach v. Ohio State Racing Commission, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 540,
147 N.E.2d 258 (1955); State v. Steger, 94 W. Va. 576, 119 S.E. 682 (1923); St.
Louis v. Slupsky, 254 Mo. 309, 162 S.W. 155 (1914); State v. Schlottman, 52
Mo. 164 (1873).
7. State v. Steger, supra note 6, at 580, 119 S.E. at 683.
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absent an incitement or immediate threat of violence.8 Whether abusive
language was indictable at common law is no longer an important issue.
Statutes, varying in their general format, were passed in virtually every
jurisdiction that rendered the use of abusive language a criminal offense.9
They include breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, or the
separate offense of using offensive language. But all of these legislative
enactments fall under the general category of crimes against the public
peace. Further, the manner and circumstances in which the language
is used may vary. Some statutes render the use of obscene language an
offense if used in the presence of a girl or woman, 10 the opposite sex,"
or a child.' 2 Others condemn the use of such language in the presence of,
addressed to, or within the hearing of another, 8 in public or a public
place, 1 4 or anywhere.15  Yet, others require that the language arouses
8. See supra note 6; contra, a few early cases held that abusive language
was indictable at common law in that it was a gross violation of public decency
and good morals. Davis v. Burgess, 54 Mich. 514, 20 N.W. 540 (1884); State v.
Appling, 25 Mo. 315 (1857); Barker v. Commonwealth, 19 Penn. 412 (1852);
Bell v. State, 1 Swan 42 (Tenn. 1851).
9. See infra notes 10-19.
10. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 11 (1958) (separate offense); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 415 (West 1970) (breach of the peace); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303 (1935)
(separate offense); IDAHO CODE § 18-6409 (1948) (disorderly conduct); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-2801 (1956) (public indecency); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3560
(1969) (disturbing the peace); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-920 (1965) (separate of-
fense); N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 12 § 21-06 (1960) (separate offense); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2905.30 (Supp. 1969) (separate offense); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-24-5 (1969) (separate offense).
11. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 53 (1970) (separate offense).
12. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956) (disorderly conduct); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6409 (1948) (disorderly conduct); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3560
(1969) (disturbing the peace); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-21-06 (1960) (separate
offense); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.30 (Supp. 1969) (separate offense) S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-5 (1969) (separate offense).
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1412 (1964) (breach of peace); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53-174 (1960) (breach of peace); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.03 (1965)
(breach of peace); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303 (1935) (separate offense); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-950 (1964) (breach of the peace); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 121
(1971) (breach of peace); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570:2 (1955) (separate of-
fense); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-5 (1969) (separate offense); TEX.
PEN. CODE art. 482 (1952) (breach of peace); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-255 (1960)
(Separate offense); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68.040 (1961) (separate offense).
14. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956) (disorderly conduct); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7 § 471 (1953) (disorderly conduct); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 759-1 (1968);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2801 (1956) (public indecency); IOWA CODE ANN. § 728.1
(1950) (separate offense); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 121 (1971) (breach of
peace); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 53 (1970) (separate offense); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.364 (Supp. 1971) (disorderly conduct); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:170-
29 (1971) (disorderly conduct); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1967)
anger,16 provokes, 17 or has a tendency to provoke 8 a breach of the
peace. Finally, some merely provide for offensive or tumultuous be-
havior. 19
In spite of the numerous divergencies in statutory language, the gen-
eralization may be made that these enactments are broad and all en-
compassing. The general assumption which impliedly follows is that there
is no justification for the use of the language. In Delk v. Commonwealth,20
a minister used certain abusive words in a sermon addressed to his
congregation. The intended purpose of his sermon was to strike out
against the sin of impurity. While Delk felt that the words chosen could
best serve his design, the court held to the contrary, finding no possible
excuse for the use of such language, in the pulpit or elsewhere; Delk's
(disorderly conduct); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (1964) (separate offense); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-21-06 (1960) (separate offense); ORE. REV. STAT. § 166.060
(1969) (vagrancy); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-45-1 (Supp. 1970) (disorderly
conduct); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-558 (Supp. 1970) (disorderly conduct).
15. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-1 (1964) (breach of peace); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53-174 (1960) (breach of peace); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.05
(1965) (separate offense); IowA CODE ANN. § 728.1 (1950) (separate offense);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-950 (1964) (breach of peace); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17 § 3953 (1965) (disorderly conduct); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.364 (Supp. 1971)
(disorderly conduct); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.72 (Supp. 1971) (disorderly con-
duct); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2A:11-2089.5 (Supp. 1970) (breach of peace); Mo.
STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 562.240 (1953) (disturbing the peace); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 203.010 (1967) (breach of peace); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570:3 (1955) (sep-
arate offense); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-20-1 (Supp. 1971) (disorderly conduct);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1362 (Supp. 1970) (breach of peace); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4406 (1963) (disorderly conduct); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-45-1
(Supp. 1970) (disorderly conduct); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1213 (Supp. 1970)
(disturbing the peace); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-59-9 (1953) (breach of peace);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1021 (1958) (breach of peace).
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1412 (1964) (breach of peace); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.72 (Supp. 1971) (disorderly conduct).
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-174 (1960) (breach of peace); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 437.020 (1962) (breach of peace); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-255 (1960)
(separate offense).
18. S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 22-13-7 (1969) (separate offense); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.1-255 (1960) (separate offense); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.01
(1958) (disorderly conduct).
19. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-1 (1964) (breach of peace); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53-174 (1960) (breach of peace); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 26-1
(Smith-Hurd 1970) (disorderly conduct); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2801 (1956) (pub-
lic indecency); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.364 (Supp. 1971) (disorderly conduct);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 203.010 (1967) (breach of peace); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A
20-1 (Supp. 1971) (disorderly conduct); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4406 (1963)
(disorderly conduct); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1213 (Supp. 1970) (disturbing the
peace); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-59-9 (1953) (breach of peace); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 947.01 (1958) (disorderly conduct).
20. 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.W. 1129 (1915).
1971] CASE NOTES 549
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
excuse of merely rebuking the sin of impurity was wholly without justifi-
cation. 21
The concept relied upon in Delk-that abusive language is devoid of
any redeeming values-permeates the justification for many convictions
involving the use of abusive language. In the majority of cases, first
amendment protection is not even asserted. 22  Yet, one must not over-
look the fact that this type of legislation may render criminal, certain
activities that are constitutionally protected. Justice Black has described
disorderly conduct laws "as a meat-ax ordinance, gathering in one com-
prehensive definition of an offense a number of words which have a multi-
plicity of meanings, some of which would cover activity specifically pro-
tected by the First Amendment. '23 A similarly distasteful view of these
statutes, encompassing crimes against the public peace, is brought out in
a presidential task force report which describes these statutes as embrac-
ing "an excessively broad range of conduct, some of it dangerous, some
merely annoying, some harmless, some constitutionally protected. '24
The generality of these statutes permits a police official to exercise
broad discretionary power, and accounts for more arrests than any other
crime except drunkenness. 25  Despite the large number of arrests, there
is relatively little appellate review. A study conducted in New York re-
veals that although there were over 70,000 disorderly conduct arraign-
ments in 1957 alone, only approximately 150 reported opinions have been
handed down since the enactment of the statute in 1923.26 This looseness,
which envelops these laws, gives the police a virtual charter of authority on
the streets, which is often used against various subculture groups within
the population.2 1
Thus, against the background of a crime that did not exist at common
law, but evolved by the enaction of broad statutes tending to include
constitutionally protected interests, the issues presented in the Cohen case
find their relevance. Cohen's constitutional contention was that his con-
21. Id. at 47, 178 S.W. at 1132.
22. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Williams v.
District of Columbia, 227 A.2d 60 (C.A.D.C. 1967). See generally CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (1954); 2 ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 655-682 (1957); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 83 (1927).
23. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (concurring opinion).
24. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 102 (1967).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 103-4.
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viction for displaying distasteful words violated his right to free speech. 28
While freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected by the Consti-
tution, this safeguard does not extend to every form of utterance. 20  In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,30 which illustrates this principle, the peti-
tioner was distributing literature of the Jehovah Witnesses on a street
corner while denouncing all other religions. A crowd gathered and a
minor disturbance resulted. The police, fearful that a larger disturbance
would materialize, led Chaplinsky away but did not place him under ar-
rest. While leaving the area, Chaplinsky called the marshall "a God
damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist" and said, "the whole govern-
ment of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists."'3 1 He was con-
victed under a breach of the peace statute although he claimed free
speech protection. The Supreme Court, in affirming his conviction, laid
down in dictum what is frequently quoted as law:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that might be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
3 2
By this statement, it would appear that the Supreme Court classifies ob-
scene, profane, libelous and fighting words as not meritorious of constitu-
tional protection.
The particular word chosen by Cohen to express his deep-seated views
against the draft, although it is perhaps the most distasteful of its particular
classification of words, does not fall into the category of obscenity.3 3 This
conclusion seems more than obvious. When the Roth standard34 is ap-
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966); Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951); Nie-
molko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 289 (1951) (concurring opinion of Justice
Frankfurter); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
30. Supra note 22.
31. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 22, at 569.
32. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 22, at 571-72.
33. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). The test handed down
for obscenity is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." The test, in part, requires that the material be lascivious in some way.
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plied, the choice of Cohen's expression could in no possible way be
pruriently interesting. The court further excluded Cohen's epithet from
the classes set out in Chaplinsky by holding that while the particular
word used is often employed in a personally provocative fashion, the
manner of its use distinguishes it from the traditional fighting words.s5
Fighting words are generally of such a nature that when addressed to
a group, they will bring about some sort of reprisal and, therefore, have
fallen without the constitutional protection; this is due to their tendency
to invite others to breach the peace. 36  The Supreme Court in Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois,3 7 employed this doctrine in upholding an Illinois criminal
libel statute, proscribing conduct which downgrades any class of citizens
because of their race, creed, or color. Beauharnais was arrested for
passing out leaflets calling on the City of Chicago and its mayor to stop
the invasion of white property by negroes, who he classified as depraved,
unchaste, and unvirtuous citizens. 8  He argued, in his defense, that the
statute violated his right to free speech. However, his conviction was
affirmed, as his argument gave way to the principle that free speech is
limited and does not protect those who would incite riots and breaches
of the peace, in order to deprive others of their liberties.819
Cohen's statement was distinguished from the category of fighting
words which cause an incitement to riot and breach of the peace, because
it clearly was neither directed to the person of the hearer, nor could any-
one who read the inscription have considered it as a personal insult.40
The fact that using abusive language to express an idea will often create
a hostile reaction is not, per se, a valid reason to suppress its use. Under
our system of government, one of the main functions of free speech is to
invite dispute. Speech may often be most effective when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
35. Supra note 33, at 20.
36. See Cohen v. California, supra note 33; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 22. But see Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), where a disorderly conduct charge was reversed, in
that the ordinance permitted a conviction if the speech stirred people to anger and
thus, invaded the province of free speech. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940), where a statute that suppressed free views under the guise of con-
serving desirable conditions in the street was found to be unconstitutional.
37. Supra note 36.
38. Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 36, at 252.
39. Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 36, at 261. This holding came subse-
quent to the court's discussion of the riots, killings, and other racial problems that
had occurred in Illinois.
40. Supra note 33, at 20.
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even stirs people to anger." Similarly, the fact that an agency of the
federal government is under criticism, does not justify censoring the idea
presented. The content of speech itself cannot be the basis of a conviction
merely because the views presented are offensive to its hearers.
42
The Supreme Court, in holding that offensive language alone does not
lose its constitutional protection as speech, has in effect sounded the death
knoll for the dictum laid down in Chaplinsky.43 That there may be cer-
tain classifications of speech which, by their very utterance, are denied
constitutional protection can be seriously questioned. In New York Times
v. Sullivan,44 libelous statements were granted first amendment protection
because directed against a public official. The Alabama courts had
granted recovery to the Montgomery Police Chief for a defamatory ad-
vertisement which appeared in the New York Times; however, the Su-
preme Court reversed the Alabama court because the law failed to pro-
vide safeguards for freedom of speech and press, required by the first
amendment. 45  Although obscenity is not within the constitutional ambit
of free speech or press, 46 recent obscenity cases have presented such a
myriad of constitutional "stumbling blocks" that obscenity, in effect, occu-
pies the same preferred position as free speech. 47 The granting of first
amendment protection to the use of abusive language rounds off the dis-
sipation of unprotected classes of speech. Clearly, after the Cohen deci-
sion, the denial of free speech protection cannot be based solely on the
ability of the prosecution to characterize the defendant's statement as a
particular form of expression denounced in Chaplinsky.
41. Terminiello v. Chicago, supra note 36, at 4. Accord, Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
238 (1963). But see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v.
United States, supra note 29; Frohwerk v. United States, supra note 29, where
circumstances such as war or a national emergency will have a decided effect on
what can be said or printed. Compare Feiner v. New York, supra note 29, where
the contents of the speech were designed to incite the listeners to go out and riot.
42. See Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 571 (1970); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, supra note 29, at 272 (1951);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
43. Supra textual quote indicated at supra note 32.
44. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45. Id. at 264, 270. The court stated that they considered the case within
the concept that debate on public issues should be robust and uninhibited. Wide,
open discussion may, at times well include unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials. Because of this national commitment, a public offi-
cial has to show actual malice, in order to recover on a libel action.
46. Roth v. United States, supra note 34, at 485.
47. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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Since opprobrious language per se is presently considered to be pro-
tected speech, a conviction for the use of a "four letter" word can stand
only if some other conduct, not amounting to pure speech, is concom-
mitant with the words. The mere fact that speech is involved does not
give an act unbridled protection. 48  More often than not, when speech is
involved, there is accompanying conduct such as the time, place, or man-
ner in which the speech is uttered. It is against these added considera-
tions that the state's interest in regulating may be sustained.
Since the prime effectiveness of speech is its power to criticize existing
conditions and persuade others of a point of view,49 the free speech issue
often arises in the area of protest for change. In order to achieve the
desired result, the protestor must reach as wide an audience as is hu-
manly possible. Obviously, the most logical forum for a large audience
would be a place in which a mass of people could easily be gathered-
the streets, parks, highways and other public places. However, when a
protest is moved into public places, it runs the risk of providing the
state with those factors against which it may effectively legislate. For,
while the right to protest through speech is constitutionally protected,
the extent of such protection cannot possibly extend to all forms of con-
duct.50
In the Cohen case, the state unsuccessfully attempted to attack the
conduct of wearing a jacket, containing an offensive statement against
the draft, in a court room corridor where women and children were
present by separating Cohen's conduct from his speech. 51 While it is
difficult to untangle speech and conduct, a state may constitutionally pro-
hibit conduct even though speech may be incidentally affected.52  When
conduct, as distinct from speech, is the subject of state regulation, the
48. See supra note 29. Cf. Annot., 21 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1969); annot., 16
L. Ed. 2d 1053 (1966); annot., 11 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1964).
49. See supra note 41.
50. Adderley v. Florida, supra note 29; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
In Cox, at 574, the court stated: "[TIhe right of peaceful protest does not
mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may do so at anytime and at
any place. There is a proper time and place for even the most peaceful protest
and a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all citizens to obey all valid laws
and regulations." The court proceeded to state that there are also requirements for
laws to be drawn so that people have fair warning as to what is illegal.
51. Supra note 33.
52. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Cox v.
Louisiana, supra note 50, at 562 (1965); Street v. New York, supra note 42, at 615
(1969) (dissent of Justice Fortas); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968). Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Adderley v.
Florida, supra note 29.
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free speech issues are minimal. Therefore, as in Cohen, states have at-
tempted to legislate against conduct, indirectly oppressing unpopular and
offensive speech under the guise of punishing conduct. 53 However, when
the conduct is such that it becomes indistinguishable from speech as a
form of expression, the courts have faced a dilemma; this is the problem
presented to the Court in Cohen.
Conduct was first recognized as having the quality of becoming so inter-
twined in speech as to become the expression itself in Stromberg v. Cali-
fornia.54 Stromberg, a member of the Young Communist League, worked
as a supervisor of a summer camp for children. She taught children
class-consciousness and that the workers of the world were all brothers.
Because Stromberg directed the children daily in the raising of a red
flag (that of the U.S.S.R. and the Communist Party of the United States)
and the recital of a worker's pledge of allegience, she was convicted of
violating a state statute which prohibited the display of a red flag as an
emblem of opposition to organized government. Stromberg claimed that
the state statute was unconstitutional by reason of the first amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed her conviction upon the ground that it vio-
lated free political discussion. A statute, which on its face would punish
one who tried to avail himself of this right, cannot constitutionally stand. 55
53. It should be noted that merely because the state is able to separate con-
duct from speech, it does not necessarily follow that a conviction will be sustained.
For a general discussion of the tests the Supreme Court use, see Emerson, Toward
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963). For cases
where conduct has been separated from speech, see Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S.
564 (1970) (demonstrating outside induction center); Gregory v. Chicago, supra
note 23 (march through streets); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, supra
note 52 (demonstrating in street); United States v. O'Brien, supra note 52 (burning
draft card); Adderley v. Florida, supra note 29 (trespass); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131 (1966) (silent protest in library); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963) (protest outside courthouse); Walker v. City of Birmingham, supra
note 52 (parading in streets); Cox v. Louisiana, supra note 50 (picketing near
courthouse); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parading in street);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing labor dispute); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound amplifier); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948) (sound amplifier); Breard v. Alexandria, supra note 29 (door to door
solicitation); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (distributing handbills door
to door); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distributing handbills in street).
54. Supra note 29.
55. Stromberg v. California, supra note 29, at 369. The court found the statute
prohibiting the display of a red flag unconstitutional, because it prohibited a means
of expressing a political view: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the se-
curity of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A
statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefi-
nite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to
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Thus, symbolic speech was born in the Court's holding that a red flag
can be a constitutional means of expressing one's political views.
The symbolic speech doctrine was carried one step further in West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.5" The defendant school
board had adopted a resolution requiring school children to salute the
flag and specifying that refusal to do so is insubordination. A group
of Jehovah's Witnesses, contending that saluting a flag amounts to paying
homage to an idol, obtained an injunction against its enforcement. The
Court looked upon the mandatory requirement of saluting a flag as com-
pelling the students to express a belief in violation of their first amend-
ment rights:
There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is a form of
utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas .. .
A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's
comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn.5 7
In upholding the plaintiffs' refusal to salute, the Court approved silence
or inaction as a symbolic method of expressing views.
Although both the Stromberg and Barnette cases recognized that con-
duct can, under certain circumstances, be equivalent to speech, neither
decision attempted to identify the point at which conduct became speech.
The necessity for such a distinction is evidenced by United States v.
O'Brien,5" in which O'Brien had burned his selective service card before
the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment." Thus, the court
emphasized the importance of free political discussion.
56. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
57. Id. at 632-33.
58. Supra note 52. The lack of a sufficient distinction for the time at which
conduct becomes speech, has caused a diversity of problems in the lower courts.
These problems have been aggravated by the statement in O'Brien at 376: "We
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be la-
beled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to ex-
press an idea." The courts have, on occasion, held certain conduct to be protected
as symbolic speech. These decisions are generally void of any explanation for the
fact that conduct is considered speech, other than the fact that it expresses an idea.
Cf. Hill v. Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.C. 1971) (armbands); Crosson v. Silver,
319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970) (burning flag); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138
(D. Md. 1970) (artistic representation of burning flag); Aguirre v. Tahoka Inde-
pendent School Dist., 311 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (armbands); Reichen-
berg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970) (hair length); Westley v. Rossi,
305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969) (hair length); Leslie Tobin Imports, Inc., v.
Rizzo, 305 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Penn. 1969) (buttons); Richards v. Thurston,
304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969) (hair length); Einhorn v. Maus, 300 F. Supp.
1169 (E.D. Penn. 1969) (armbands); State v. Lundquist, - Md. -, 278 A.2d 263
(1971) (saluting flag). However, the questions that most frequently confront the
courts are whether all communicative action is symbolic speech and whether all
symbolic speech is protected. Further, the question of whether a person has, in
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a sizeable crowd, in order to influence others to adopt his anti-war be-
liefs. Indicted under a section of the Universal Training and Service
Act, which prohibited knowing mutilation of one's registration card,
O'Brien asserted as his defense that the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it denied the right of freedom of expression. After a lengthy dis-
cussion of the history and purposes underlying a draft card law, the
court found the conduct unrelated to O'Brien's expression.5 9  The
government interest involved is the efficient operation of the Selective
Service System. The separate conduct for which O'Brien was convicted,
was the destruction of his selective service card, which tended toward the
disruption of the smooth functioning of that system, and as such, was
separate and apart from any expression of anti-war views that the card
burning may have symbolized. 0 From O'Brien it can be concluded that
a government may regulate when the expression intended is not related
to the conduct prohibited, and any incidental restrictions upon speech are
minimal.61
fact, intended such conduct to operate as symbolic speech heightens the dilemma.
Generally, the courts have treated these problems by holding that such conduct was
not intended to be protected, or by assuming arguendo, that such conduct was
considered to be speech, and then by going on to show a sufficient governmental
interest. Cf. United States v. Zink, 436 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1971) (burning draft
card); Banks v. Muncie Community Schools, 433 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1970)
(school symbols); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (wearing
button in classroom); Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970) (delivery
of contraceptive); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) (hair
length); United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969) (mutilation
of public records); United States v. Gutknecht, 406 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1969) (drop-
ping draft card at marshall's feet); Zigmond v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16,
396 F.2d 290 (1st Cir. 1968) (turning in draft card); United States v. Miller,
367 F.2d 72 (2nd Cir. 1966) (burning draft card); Press v. Pasadena Independent
School District, 326 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (wearing pantsuit); Gere v.
Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Penn. 1970) (hair length); Hernandez v.
School District Number One, Denver, Colo., 315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970)
(black berets combined with disruptive conduct); Livingston v. Swanquist, 314
F. Supp. 1 (N.D. I11. 1970) (hair length); United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp.
1111 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (flag burning); Koehl v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Va.
1969) (nazi uniform); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968)(destroying draft files); Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) (hair
length); State v. Adams, 3 Wash. App. 849, 479 P.2d 148 (1971) (use of set net
in salmon fishing); Kleijans v. Lombardi, 52 H. 427, 478 P.2d 320 (1970) (occu-
pying office of university official); State v. Nelson, - Iowa -, 178 N.W.2d 434
(1970) (disrobing at sex education program); Scott v. Board of Ed., U.F. Sch.
Dist. #17, Hicksville, 61 Misc. 333, 305 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1969) (female students
wearing slacks). See generally Comment, THE LEGALrrY OF DRESS CODES FOR
STUDENTS, ET AL., 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 222, 229-231 (1971).
59. United States v. O'Brien, supra note 52, at 377.
60. United States v. O'Brien, supra note 52, at 385-86.
61. United States v. O'Brien, supra note 52, at 377. According to O'Brien, a
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A year after O'Brien, another protest against war by the use of sym-
bolic conduct came before the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines
School District.62  The conduct involved in the Tinker case was the
wearing of black armbands by a group of students, in order to publicize
their objections to the war in Vietnam.68 The decision to wear the arm-
bands was made at a meeting attended by a group of adults and students.
The various school officials became aware of the plan and adopted the
policy that any student wearing a black armband would be asked to re-
move it. Refusal would be followed by suspension. The petitioner
wore the armband, refused to remove it, and was suspended. A com-
plaint was filed seeking an injunction, preventing further disciplinary
action and nominal damages for the period in which the students were
actually suspended.
The court held that the fact of wearing the armbands is entirely di-
vorced from actual or potentially disruptive conduct and thus, is closely
akin to pure speech.6 4  In order to justify the armband prohibition,
school officials had the burden of proving that its actions were caused
by more than a desire to avoid the unpleasantness that accompanies an
unpopular viewpoint. 5 The decision laid down in Tinker raised a ques-
tion with regard to the rationale of the court's holding in O'Brien. 6 Did
the court oversimplify the free speech elements in draft card burning?
One who burns his draft card does not intend to disrupt the Selective
Service System. Instead, he is essentially concerned with the value of his
act as an expression. Surely, one person's burning of his draft card
would be literally devoid of destructive effect.6 7
Any logical basis of distinction between O'Brien and Tinker was fur-
ther confused by Street v. New York 68  Hearing a news bulletin con-
government regulation is justified if: (1) it is in the constitutional power of the
government to regulate it; (2) it furthers an important or substantial government
interest; (3) free speech is not related to the governmental interest; and (4) if any
incidental restrictions fall upon free speech, they are no greater than what is essential
to protect that interest.
62. Supra note 41.
63. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., supra note 41.
64. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., supra note 41, at 505.
65. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., supra note 41, at 509.
66. United States v. O'Brien, supra note 52.
67. Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft Card Burning Case,
1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 15 (1968). Compare Justice Black's dissent, Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., supra note 41, at 514, where he feels that the record shows
that the armbands took the other students' minds off their classwork and thus, dis-
rupted the normal classroom process.
68. Supra note 42.
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cerning the shooting of civil rights leader, James Meredith, Street took an
American flag to a street corner near his home and proceeded to burn it.
A small crowd had gathered and he told them, "We don't need no
damn flag . . . If they let that happen to Meredith, we don't need an
American flag." 69  Street was arrested and convicted under a statute
proscribing the casting of contempt by acts or words upon any American
flag. Street claimed as his defense that his act was performed as a
means of expressing his right to free speech. In reversing his convic-
tion, the Supreme Court, under a tortured reading of the legal posture
within which the case arose, decided that the indictment may have been for
the words he uttered. Since he could not be punished for the words
spoken, the Court ruled that there was no reason to decide whether he
could have been punished for burning the flag. 70 In comparing the
Street decision with that in O'Brien and Tinker, one can only conclude
that the area of symbolic speech is indeed one of uncertainty.
Cohen v. California71 was the next decision handed down in the sym-
bolic conduct area, but it also failed to enunciate a definitive standard
as to when conduct becomes speech. Between the time of the Cohen and
Street decisions, Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion to a per curiam
decision, 72 recognized the need for some substantial standard:
The court has, as yet, not established a test for determining at what point conduct
becomes so intertwined with expression that it becomes necessary to weigh the
State's interest in proscribing conduct against the constitutionally protected interests
in freedom of expression.73
Because Cohen was the next full opinion to be handed down, the logical
conclusion would be that it would contain some clarification of this test.
But Cohen instead, by failing to do this, has only added haze to this
already cloudy issue.
Cohen's conduct in wearing the jacket through the court's corridor was
dismissed rather lightly. The court found that the only conduct involved
was that of communication and, therefore, held it to be solely within the
69. Street v. New York, supra note 42, at 579.
70. Street v. New York, supra note 42, at 594. See generally Comment, Flag
Desecration Under the First Amendment: Conduct or Speech, 32 Ohio St. L.J. 119
(1971).
71. Supra note 33.
72. Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371 (1970). See also Schacht v. United
States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) where, in a per curiam opinion, the court reversed the
conviction of petitioner who wore parts of an army uniform in a street skit, put
on before an induction center, in order to show his dissent to the Viet Nam War.
The court felt that a statute which allowed an actor to wear an army uniform in
a play, only so long as it did not discredit the army, was a violation of free speech.
73. Cowgill v. California, supra note 71, at 372.
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purview of free speech.74  In a sense the Cohen decision is as over-
simplified as O'Brien. Was not the disruption in the courthouse, caused
by the presence of Cohen and his jacket, of greater proportion than that
caused to the Selective Service System by the burning of a solitary draft
card? For what reason was the conduct, relied upon in the lower court,
dismissed so readily as pure speech, without an attempt to delineate the
point at which conduct becomes speech? The only logical interpretation
of the Cohen decision is that the background of the case weighed heavily
in its final outcome. 75
In conclusion, the Cohen decision has had a dual effect. In one area
it enhanced the importance of freedom of speech, by granting first
amendment protection to the use of opprobrious language. It further recog-
nized that there may be an inherent value in the exposition of ideas in
such language. The best example of this proposition is a California
appellate decision which relied on Cohen. There, the defendant dis-
played a poster in the rear of his automobile reading "Fuck War." In
commenting on its redeeming social importance, the court stated: "[I]n
its condemnation of war, petitioner's language-whatever its bad taste-
might reasonably be deemed a condemnation of what some view as
mankind's greatest 'obscenity'."'76
In the wake of Cohen, the proliferation of buttons, T-shirts, bumper
stickers, and the like, bearing distasteful inscriptions is highly probable.
What may add shock value to today's protestors may also cause the dis-
ruption of courts, schools, libraries, and other public buildings. To pro-
tect against abuses, statutes with more specific language will have to be
enacted to deal with the disruption, rather than the offensive nature of
the language.
The second effect of Cohen, is that the Court's refusal to establish
a formula as to when conduct becomes speech, has made the state leg-
islators' task even more arduous. Without a strict standard to employ
as a guideline, the legislators' problem in drafting statutes indirectly and
incidentally affecting speech is perplexing, if not impossible. When may
conduct plus speech be constitutionally prohibited? Within the frame-
work of Cohen, Tinker, O'Brien, et al., the legislators are unable to answer
this difficult question.
Perhaps the Court's failure to enunciate a standard for regulating
conduct plus speech may be explained by the fact that Cohen is a very
74. Supra note 33, at 18.
75. See text at supra note 9.
76. In re Richard Perlman, 18 Cal. App. 3d 178, 95 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1971).
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close case-a five-to-four decision. With four justices dissenting, the
Court may simply have found it impossible to establish a new test for
deciding at what point on the speech-conduct continuum conduct falls
without the first amendment immunity. One may further speculate that
in light of the extreme difficulty the Court encountered in administering
the Roth test for obscenity, it was hesitant to attempt another formula for
gauging the first amendment's ambit. To whatever reason the Court's
failure to act may be attributed, the Cohen decision clearly leaves a large
and an undesirable void in the contours of free speech and expression.
Thomas W. Murphy
